site.btaIf Amended as Proposed, Constitution Would Reform Judiciary, Curb President's Powers, Democratize Regulators' Election

A bill to amend and supplement Bulgaria's constitution, moved by GERB-UDF, Continue the Change - Democratic Bulgaria and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms on July 28, would reform the judicial system, limit some of the President's powers, and democratize the election of members of regulatory and control authorities.

Judicial Reform

The amendments would restructure the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which is kept as an administrative and personnel-management authority for judges only. Eight of the SJC 15 members would be elected directly by judges in the regional, district, appellate and supreme courts, five members would be elected by the National Assembly, and the presidents of the two supreme courts would be members by right. The SJC would be chaired by the president of the Supreme Court of Cassation and, in his or her absence, by the president of the Supreme Administrative Court.

The term of office of the presidents of the two supreme courts would be reduced to five years from seven now, with the possibility of a single re-appointment. They would be appointed and released directly by the SJC, and the President would not have a say in the matter.  

The revisions provide for the establishment of a separate Prosecutors Council of ten members: two elected directly by prosecutors, one elected directly by investigating magistrates, six elected by parliament from among representatives of various legal professions and organizations, and the prosecutor general, who would be an ex officio member. The minister of justice may attend the meetings of the Prosecutors Council in a non-voting capacity.  

The Prosecutors Council would exercise the key career and disciplinary powers with regard to prosecutors. The structure of the prosecution service would be decentralized.

The prosecutor general would be appointed by the Prosecutors Council on the initiative of the minister of justice or of three members of the Prosecutors Council. The term of office of the prosecutor general would be reduced to five years from seven years now.

The amendments set up a special mechanism for the investigation of the prosecutor general. If suspected of committing a publicly prosecutable offence, he or she would be investigated by a special prosecutor who has served as a criminal judge at a supreme or appellate court when appointed. The appointment procedure would be established by law.

The revisions would limit the functions of the prosecution service to criminal procedure, divesting it of the powers to exercise general supervision as to legality of acts and steps of state bodies.

Caretaker Cabinet Reform

The amended Constitution provides for denying the President full discretion in appointing a caretaker prime minister, limiting his or her choice to the chair of the National Assembly, the president of the Constitutional Court and the governor of the Bulgarian National Bank. A caretaker cabinet would be appointed by the President on a proposal by the prime minister. The President would schedule parliamentary elections within two months after the appointment of a caretaker cabinet. 

The period during which Parliament does not sit in case of early elections would be limited to one month. Parliament would not sit within one month before polling day.

Election/Appointment of Senior Public Officials

The revisions abolish a discriminatory provision limiting eligibility for senior public office to persons holding Bulgarian citizenship only.

With regard to the election of members of independent regulatory and control authorities, the amendments would require public nomination and hearing of candidates, clear eligibility criteria, a possibility for members of the public and representatives of professional organizations to express opinions and monitor the process, and limiting the number of successive terms in office.

The bill introduces an individual constitutional complaint against acts of Parliament and enables the lower courts to approach the Constitutional Court directly regarding the constitutionality of a law applicable to a particular case that they examine. The grounds for admissibility of such petitions would be regulated by an express law.