site.btaGreece’s North Africa Strategy Falters Amid Shifting Regional Ties

Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean is never simple, but until recently, one partnership appeared relatively stable - that between Greece and Egypt. The two countries, along with the Cairo-backed authority of rebel marshal Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya, formed a counterweight to the axis between Turkiye and the official Libyan government in Tripoli. These antagonistic alliances formed the diagonals of a geopolitical quadrilateral, and at their intersection - at least from Athens’ perspective - lay the dispute over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Mediterranean Sea.

A material expression of both alliances and their opposing stances came in the form of memorandums for partial delimitation of EEZs - one signed between Turkiye and Libya in 2019, and the other between Greece and Egypt in 2020. The two mutually exclusive documents reflect the official positions of Ankara and Athens, respectively, on an issue with potential implications for significant natural gas reserves beneath the seafloor.

For Greece, the alliance with Egypt was part of a broader international framework aimed - not least - at regionally isolating Turkiye. For Cairo, the partnership with Athens was one aspect of its antagonism toward Ankara following the 2013 ousting of Egypt’s Islamist government led by Mohamed Morsi.

Nearly a decade later, however, relations between Egypt and Turkiye began to thaw. In 2022, Presidents Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Recep Tayyip Erdogan shook hands at the World Cup in Qatar. While at the time this was seen as a symbolic gesture of civility, by 2024 the warming of ties became undeniable, with Erdogan visiting Cairo and Sisi traveling to Ankara.

The cooling of relations between Egypt and Greece was not far behind, and became apparent just months later. Tensions began to surface in May, when an Egyptian court ruled in a longstanding legal case that the real estate of the ancient Orthodox monastery of St. Catherine on the Sinai Peninsula was state property. Although Greece does not officially have a direct stake in the case, the Greek-speaking monastery is viewed by Athens as part of its cultural heritage in North Africa. As Greek media reported at the time, the Greek government had believed the issue would be resolved through an out-of-court settlement, so the ruling came as an unpleasant surprise - a fait accompli by a supposed ally. Despite Egyptian assurances that the monastery’s status would not be affected, and Greece’s efforts to maintain a calm tone for the sake of broader interests, bitterness lingered in bilateral contacts.

The next challenge for Greek policy in North Africa came from Libya, where reports emerged that the House of Representatives was considering ratifying the 2019 Turkiye - Libya EEZ memorandum. This legislative body, based in Tobruk - a city under the control of Haftar’s separatist forces, backed by countries including Egypt - had previously rejected the memorandum, seemingly aligning with Greece’s position. A reversal of that stance, however, would be troubling, especially since the eastern Libyan coast is currently a major source of migration flows into Greece, and Athens is seeking cooperation with Haftar on this issue as well.

At the same time, Turkiye appears to be courting eastern Libyan authorities, recently inviting Haftar’s son, Saddam, commander of the land forces of the so-called Libyan National Army, to Ankara. In response, Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis made a swift diplomatic tour of Benghazi - eastern Libya’s main city - and Tripoli, seat of the internationally recognized government. The trip yielded a general commitment to negotiations on the EEZ issue, but no concrete outcomes.

Another diplomatic setback for Greece came shortly after. Just two days after Gerapetritis’ visit to Benghazi on July 6, Greek Migration Minister Thanos Plevris, along with his counterparts from Malta and Italy and EU Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner, attempted to visit the same city. The delegation intended to discuss migration issues with the eastern Libyan leadership. However, the three ministers and the EU Commissioner were not even allowed to disembark from their plane and were declared persona non grata, accused of violating diplomatic protocol and disregarding the host country's sovereignty. Although the embarrassment was shared by Malta, Italy, and the European Commission, the incident once again highlighted the fragility of Greece’s influence in the region.

The latest in a series of headaches for Athens came during the August 6 visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to Athens. That same day, Greek news site Enikos.gr published a verbal note from Egypt’s foreign ministry, which had been handed to the Greek embassy in Cairo back in July. The note stated that "certain areas outlined in Greece’s Marine Spatial Planning Plan overlap with the EEZ and continental shelf of the Arab Republic of Egypt in the Mediterranean Sea."

Since the 2020 memorandum between Greece and Egypt only partially defined their maritime boundaries, the Greek Foreign Ministry downplayed the note as an "expected reaction from a neighboring state via routine diplomatic correspondence." Nevertheless, nearly all major opposition forces in Greece accused the government of inaction, lack of transparency, and absence of strategic direction.

The challenges facing Greek diplomacy in North Africa are likely tied both to the rapprochement between Egypt and Turkiye and to the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip - two factors that may also be interconnected. During the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Egypt last Saturday, he and his Egyptian counterpart Abdelatty emphasized the need for unity among Islamic countries against Israeli military actions and plans to occupy Gaza City.

Meanwhile, Greece is attempting to strike a difficult balance between its strategic defense partnership with Israel and its relations with the Arab world, including participation in humanitarian missions in Gaza and calls for an immediate ceasefire.

Whether this balancing act is sustainable remains to be seen. But what is clear is that Greece’s once stable regional policies - particularly in North Africa - are increasingly turning into unpredictable variables.