site.btaMedia Review: April 24
Political developments involving Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria electoral dominance and Borislav Sarafov’s resignation as acting prosecutor general dominate Friday’s news media, highlighting broader debates on power consolidation and judicial independence in Bulgaria.
POLITICS
Capital leads with an analysis that Rumen Radev and his newly formed Progressive Bulgaria party have secured full political power after winning an outright parliamentary majority, creating conditions for fast decision-making and sweeping reforms, but also raising concerns about authoritarian drift and excessive concentration of power. With nearly 1.5 million votes, Progressive Bulgaria won 131 seats in Parliament, above the 121 needed for a majority, allowing Radev to govern alone without coalition negotiations or dependence on smaller parties. The result gives him broad control over the legislative and executive branches and the ability to push through major reforms, appointments and policy decisions with little institutional resistance. The election marks a dramatic break with the cycle of weak and short-lived governments that characterized Bulgarian politics in recent years. According to the analysis, voters rewarded Radev for successfully consolidating the protest vote that had previously been fragmented among multiple anti-establishment parties over the last five years. Radev’s next major test will be judicial reform, particularly the election of a new Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) which will elect a prosecutor general. Achieving this would require broader parliamentary support, most likely from Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria (CC-DB), which has long advocated for judicial reform. This process will show whether Radev genuinely intends to dismantle the influence networks associated with GERB leader Boyko Borissov and Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) leader Delyan Peevski or merely replace them with loyalists linked to Progressive Bulgaria. The GERB and MRF political camp, which dominated Bulgarian politics for years, suffered major setbacks. GERB lost around 210,000 votes compared with the previous parliamentary election, while nationalist party Vazrazhdane also saw a sharp decline, with much of its electorate shifting to Radev’s formation. Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) failed to enter Parliament, a development the article says could accelerate its fragmentation and strengthen Radev’s dominance over the centre-left political space. Despite remaining in opposition, CC-DB was the only major parliamentary force to improve its electoral result. Capital argues that staying outside government may ultimately benefit the coalition because it avoids internal tensions over foreign policy and gives it room to act as a constructive opposition force. The article compares Radev’s political dominance to the situation of former prime minister Ivan Kostov and the Union of Democratic Forces in the late 1990s, when they also governed with a strong parliamentary majority during a period of political crisis.
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24 Chasa has an interview with political scientist Ognyan Minchev, who argues that the “glue” holding together the CC-DB coalition is weakening, and that a possible leftward shift by CC could open the door to cooperation with BSP. Minchev says the recent election reflects the consolidation of power around three personalized political centres in Bulgaria - Borissov, Peevski, and Radev. Minchev argues that the vote on April 19 marked a decisive victory for Radev and suggests this could lead to a more concentrated form of one-person rule. He describes the broader political shift as a “change of regime through elections,” driven by the reconfiguration of Bulgaria’s oligarchic and political networks rather than a traditional revolution. This realignment raises the possibility of cooperation between CC-DB and the new majority led by Progressive Bulgaria, particularly around key institutional reforms such as the appointment of a new SJC. However, Minchev warns that such cooperation could easily turn into political instrumentalization, especially if opposition partners fail to safeguard their independence in the process. He also argues that Democratic Bulgaria could strengthen its position by shifting further to the right and consolidating its identity around traditional pro-Western, reformist values, while CC is more likely to move toward the centre-left and potentially seek cooperation with a reform-oriented wing of BSP. In his view, this divergence reflects deeper ideological tensions within the coalition that have always existed beneath its surface unity. CC-DB was held together mainly by the instability of the broader political system over the past five years. With the emergence of a dominant new governing force, he suggests that the “cement” holding the coalition together is weakening, increasing the likelihood of fragmentation, though both parties may still find separate strategic opportunities depending on how the political landscape continues to evolve.
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Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) has an interview with political scientist Petar Cholakov, who warned that a political reorientation toward Radev could expand beyond local authorities and also affect the National Assembly. In an interview, he argued that a split within CC-DB would be a serious strategic mistake, especially given the current dominance of Progressive Bulgaria in Parliament. Cholakov noted that tensions and internal competition for influence have long existed within the coalition, pointing to ongoing disputes over representation and party figures, which he said have not translated into electoral gains. According to him, there is disappointment within the political formation, as some expected to benefit more from the fall of Rosen Zhelyazkov's cabinet, while instead “others took the advantage.” Cholakov further suggested that parts of local government had already begun shifting their alignment toward Radev as early as last autumn, with a second wave of such political realignment likely around upcoming local elections. Cholakov added that these tendencies could intensify not only at municipal level but potentially also within Parliament.
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24 Chasa’s front-page story warns that Bulgaria’s inflated electoral rolls, filled with so-called “phantom voters,” are undermining trust in the electoral process, after multiple cases of deceased citizens appearing in voter lists. The article says that the name of Ivo Kalushev, who was killed in the Petrohan lodge tragedy, and that of former 24 Chasa editor-in-chief Borislav Zyumbyulev, who died nearly two years ago, were both found in municipal voter lists. According to data cited in the report, Bulgaria’s electoral register contains about 6.57 million names, while the actual number of eligible residents is just over 5.2 million, meaning there are roughly 1.3 to 1.4 million “phantom voters” that do not correspond to real citizens. The analysis quotes electoral expert Mihail Konstantinov, who explains that while most of these discrepancies are due to citizens living abroad, a smaller portion involves deceased persons who have not yet been removed from the lists due to administrative delays. In some cases, such as the examples cited in the article, the delay between death and removal from the register has ranged from two months to nearly two years, significantly longer than the legally expected timeframe. He explains that delays are often caused by bureaucratic procedures, especially when deaths occur abroad and require documentation to pass through consular services before reaching Bulgaria’s civil registration authorities. As a possible solution, the analysis discusses proposals for “active voter registration,” a system in which citizens would need to confirm their intention to vote in order to remain on electoral rolls. Under such a model, voters could register electronically or through other communication channels, reducing the number of inactive or absent voters in the system. Konstantinov estimates that such a reform could remove between 800,000 and 900,000 names from the lists.
JUSTICE
Capital publishes an analysis by journalist Polina Paunova arguing that the rapid resignation of acting Prosecutor General Borislav Sarafov - only three days after the parliamentary elections and one day after former caretaker interior minister Ivan Demerdzhiev, now associated with Progressive Bulgaria, called for action against what he described as an illegitimate acting prosecutor general - provides fresh evidence of the Bulgarian judiciary’s dependence on political power rather than on the rule of law. The article says the SJC Prosecutors Chamber, which immediately accepted Sarafov’s resignation and appointed deputy prosecutor general Vanya Stefanova as acting prosecutor general, acted with “well-rehearsed reflexes” and political obedience. The speed of the transition demonstrated that political signals carried more weight for the prosecution service than court rulings or legal arguments. Bulgaria’s Supreme Court of Cassation had for months refused to recognize Sarafov’s legitimacy, but those judicial objections failed to produce action until political pressure emerged from the incoming ruling majority. This sequence of events shows that both Sarafov and the Prosecutors Chamber were willing to ignore legal and constitutional concerns while the previous governing coalition led by Borissov and supported by Peevski remained influential, but moved immediately once the political balance shifted after the election victory of Radev and Progressive Bulgaria. In his farewell statement, Sarafov said conditions now existed for “a new stage in the development of the prosecution service” based on “stability and predictability.” He also claimed he had long considered stepping down but did not want to destabilize the institution during a prolonged political crisis. Amendments to the Judicial System Act adopted in 2025 limited acting appointments to six months, meaning Sarafov’s mandate should have expired in July 2025. The Prosecutors Chamber adopted the interpretation that the new rules did not apply retroactively to him because he had assumed the position before the amendments entered into force. However, Sarafov made no mention of the legal arguments that he should have vacated the post months earlier. The commentary draws parallels with the removal of former prosecutor general Ivan Geshev and recalls the leaked phrase allegedly spoken by Sarafov before Geshev’s dismissal: “We are regrouping.” The latest developments suggest the same institutional model remains intact, one in which judicial authorities adapt to whichever political force is currently dominant. Looking ahead, Capital says the election of a permanent prosecutor general will depend on the appointment of a new SJC, which requires a constitutional majority of 160 MPs. Progressive Bulgaria and CC-DB currently have enough votes to achieve this if they cooperate.
Speaking on Bulgarian National Television’s morning programme, legal expert Ivan Bregov (Institute for Market Economics) and former acting prosecutor general Boyko Naydenov commented on the resignation of Borislav Sarafov, the future of the judiciary and ongoing processes in the prosecution service. Naydenov said it is an indisputable fact that the political environment contributed to Sarafov’s resignation, but questioned what specifically prompted the delayed implementation of the legal requirement one year later. He argued that political actors played a role in ultimately resolving what he described as a “Gordian knot,” warning that this reflects continued dependence of parts of the judiciary, particularly the prosecution, on “the politically strong of the day.” He added that meaningful reform would require changes to the Judicial System Act, as well as to the composition of the SJC and its inspectorate. Bregov, in turn, described the case as an act of withdrawal of consent by Sarafov, while criticizing the SJC Prosecutors Chamber for inconsistent application of the law. He suggested that disciplinary proceedings against members of the SJC could follow if damage to the reputation of the judiciary is established. According to him, such developments would indicate whether there is genuine political will to dismantle entrenched networks of influence within the justice system.
Speaking in an interview for BNR, former interior minister and law professor Prof. Veselin Vuchkov criticized repeated proposals to create new investigative bodies, arguing that “bypassing the prosecution” through such structures is not an effective approach. Commenting on the draft anti-corruption legislation prepared by caretaker Justice Minister Andrey Yankulov’s team, he stated that efforts should instead focus on reforming and strengthening the prosecutorial authority, rather than building successive layers of investigative institutions. According to him, past experience shows that establishing new bodies under the Criminal Procedure Code has never produced successful results. Vuchkov also noted that, following the Anti-Corruption Commission’s restructuring under institutional changes in Bulgaria’s anti-corruption system, there has effectively been no active fight against corruption through criminal law mechanisms in recent months. He stressed the need for improvements to the Criminal Procedure Code, though he expressed skepticism that the current parliament is capable of undertaking “radical reforms.” Commenting on recent developments in the judiciary and the position of the acting prosecutor general, he suggested that institutional changes reflect political calculations and possible “regrouping talks,” while also pointing to unresolved high-profile cases and what he described as insufficiently energetic prosecutorial work.
On Nova TV’s morning programme, lawyer Emil Georgiev from Justice for All and Associate Professor Hristo Hristov, lecturer in European Law, commented on whether control and transparency in the judicial system are likely to increase following the resignation of Borislav Sarafov. The participants agreed that a fundamental reassessment of the state of the judiciary is needed, including a review of the individuals currently serving within the system, which would require legislative changes. According to Georgiev, a key turning point in Sarafov’s departure was the parliamentary elections and their outcome. He argued that the resignation had been anticipated within prosecutorial circles, describing it as part of an internal “regrouping” within the system, with structural arrangements made in advance to secure continuity in leadership. Georgiev further said that both the judiciary’s condition and the future vision for the system should be reconsidered in parallel, stressing the need for political and professional consensus and legal amendments. Hristov, meanwhile, said that the problems in the judiciary neither begin nor end with Sarafov’s resignation, describing it as a logical step under the current Judicial System Act and also part of a broader process of internal reconfiguration and political dependencies. He called for urgent limits on the powers of the SJC with an expired mandate and proposed more rigorous procedures for the selection and appointment of senior judicial officials to strengthen accountability and transparency.
Speaking on bTV’s morning programme, BSP - United Left Floor Leader Nataliya Kiselova linked the recent parliamentary elections with the changes in the leadership of the prosecution service, noting that earlier legal amendments envisaged limiting Sarafov’s tenure to six months from their entry into force. She argued that the developments should not be seen as political interference, but rather as an attempt by the prosecution to act pre-emptively before a new parliamentary majority is fully constituted and able to focus scrutiny on the institution. Kiselova described the recent changes as essentially an administrative reshuffle rather than a substantive transformation, noting that key positions have effectively been exchanged between long-serving prosecutors. She expressed skepticism that parliamentary inquiries or temporary commissions would lead to real reform, stressing that meaningful change must come through the judiciary itself. According to her, experienced legal professionals are likely to seek to avoid liability through procedural exits from the system. She also warned that a wave of administrative appointments in the Prosecutors Chamber could indicate efforts to consolidate influence ahead of the constitution of a new SJC.
ECONOMY
Capital has an analysis by journalist Monika Varbanova about the challenges facing the new government of Radev in securing the remaining funding under Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan within tight deadlines. The remaining payments under the plan amount to roughly half of the total financing still available to Bulgaria, including around EUR 1.16 billion in future disbursements and the unfreezing of two delayed tranches worth EUR 368 million. Given Bulgaria’s deteriorating fiscal indicators, the analysis describes these funds as potentially vital for the state budget. All reforms and projects under the plan must be completed by August 31, 2026, a deadline that cannot be renegotiated. Bulgaria must submit its request for the fifth and final payment from the European Commission by September 2026. The first major priority for the incoming government is to complete anti-corruption reforms required by Brussels. The European Commission froze EUR 368 million from the second and third payments because Bulgaria failed to establish an effective and politically independent anti-corruption commission after the previous body was abolished in January. The caretaker Government has already submitted draft legislation to establish a new independent anti-corruption commission and a revised mechanism for investigating the prosecutor general. Passing these laws in Parliament is described as critical to preventing the loss of nearly EUR 500 million, as deadlines for the frozen funds expire in May and June. The government’s administrative focus should now shift to completing large-scale projects nearing their final phase. These include the construction of STEM education centres and school modernization projects, hospital renovations and outpatient clinics in remote regions, high-tech stroke treatment centres, helicopter deliveries and hangar construction for Bulgaria’s air emergency medical service, as well as the digitalization of the electricity transmission grid and the integration of new renewable energy and storage capacity. The future government must additionally adopt several remaining technical reforms, including legislation related to water utilities, civil service integrity testing, public transport and network connectivity. With Progressive Bulgaria holding a parliamentary majority, these measures could be passed relatively quickly because the government will not depend on coalition compromises. However, some reforms may prove more difficult, particularly the restructuring of Bulgarian Energy Holding, which requires both political determination and a coherent long-term strategy that Progressive Bulgaria may not yet fully possess. If projects fail to receive EU financing because reforms are not completed on time, the costs would have to be covered by Bulgaria’s national budget, which is already under pressure with a deficit of 1.2% of GDP.
Trud publishes an analysis criticizing the caretaker Government’s decision to withdraw EUR 1.445 billion from the Bulgarian Development Bank (BDB), arguing that the move, aimed at transferring idle capital into the fiscal reserve, is procedurally flawed, legally questionable, and inconsistent with EU banking regulations. According to the BDB management, the decision was not coordinated with the bank and bypasses required approvals from key regulators such as the Bulgarian National Bank and the European Central Bank, as well as international financial partners. The article claims that, under proper procedure, any capital reduction would require a formal proposal by the Finance Minister, regulatory assessments, and a lengthy approval process, making the current government resolution effectively unenforceable. The commentary further argues that the measure resembles a political PR gesture rather than sound fiscal policy, despite its stated aim of returning “unused” public funds to citizens. It warns that the decision could restrict BDB’s ability to finance municipal investment programmes, energy efficiency projects, and EU-funded initiatives worth hundreds of millions of euro, including around EUR 246.6 million under the Recovery and Resilience Plan and a EUR 1.2 billion business support programme.
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Capital publishes an analysis on an attempt by Bulgaria’s caretaker Government to reduce controversial environmental product fees after sharp increases in 2025 drove up the prices of household appliances, solar panels and energy projects. The article says several recycling organizations raised mandatory eco-fees for electrical equipment by between seven and eleven times in a coordinated move, increasing costs for refrigerators, air conditioners and photovoltaic projects while making battery storage systems significantly more expensive. The authorities initially treated the issue as a commercial dispute between private entities, even though the state-set product fee effectively serves as the benchmark for the market. The Ministry of Environment and Water has now proposed major reductions in fees for electrical and electronic equipment, including cuts of around 70% for refrigerators and air conditioners, nearly 85% for large appliances and solar panels, and more than 90% for small appliances. The ministry’s own assessment reportedly acknowledges that Bulgaria’s fees had become far higher than European norms and were being used by private recycling organizations as pricing references. The most serious problem remains unresolved because the proposed changes do not cover batteries and energy storage systems, where the financial impact is greatest. Since battery fees are calculated by weight, industrial storage projects linked to Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan were hit particularly hard, with industry estimates suggesting the increased charges added costs equal to about 10% of total project values. The current system is especially problematic because many lithium-ion batteries imported today will only require recycling after 10 to 20 years, while Bulgaria still lacks a transparent long-term mechanism for collecting and processing them. According to the analysis, discussions are now underway about creating a state-managed fund to collect battery-related fees and finance future recycling, treating batteries not simply as waste but as a future strategic resource because of the valuable metals they contain.
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Trud reports that more than 2.7 million Bulgarians have no financial reserves for unexpected expenses, according to data from the National Statistical Institute (NSI). In total, 42.5% of the population live in households unable to cover unforeseen costs such as urgent repairs, appliance replacement or medical emergencies. Despite rising incomes and bank deposits, significant material deprivation persists, with over 39% unable to afford a one-week holiday and 37.4% unable to replace worn-out furniture. Energy poverty also remains widespread, as 16.1% of people cannot maintain a normal indoor temperature, while over 1 million face difficulties heating or cooling their homes adequately. The data further show broad limitations in daily living conditions, with nearly 20% unable to replace worn-out clothing and 24.7% unable to afford two pairs of shoes per season. Around 15.9% cannot afford meat, poultry or fish every second day, while 18.2% struggle with timely payment of household bills. In total, 15% of the population live in severe material and social deprivation, lacking at least seven of 13 basic living indicators, including internet access or car ownership. NSI also reports that 21.2% of Bulgarians live below the poverty line of EUR 453.35 EUR per month, with the risk of poverty and social exclusion affecting 29% of the population.
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