site.btaMedia Review: May 26

FLOODS: GOVERNMENT FACES FIRST TEST

Floods are the first major test for the new government, political scientist Maraya Tsvetkova said on Bulgarian National Radio. “This test will be passed if conditions for future floods are minimized. We have been in such situations before, and the response has always been somewhat ad hoc, instead of looking at the consequences and solving problems through prevention. For me, it is never enough to think in terms of ‘we will do what we can now under already force majeure circumstances.’ Rather, prevention should always be emphasized. I understand that these are natural disasters, but for years we have known that we are also, in a sense, contributing to these natural disasters against ourselves,” she said.

According to her, what is happening with floods is extremely concerning. Tsvetkova stressed such situations require collective efforts and well-organized work that should not be politicized. Ultimately, those affected by these disasters will have to deal not only with short-term damage, but also with long-term consequences, she recalled.

Tsvetkova also commented on the state’s finances and plans for administrative reform:

“It is very important to monitor the way these spending cuts will be carried out. The automatic mechanisms are being removed (for raising salaries), but this should not happen solely for the purpose of financial optimization; it must also be tied to the efficiency and effectiveness of the institutions themselves and their policies.”

According to her, the administration is full of incompetent appointments. The security sector is in great need of a reassessment not only of its methods of operation, but also of reform, Tsvetkova said. According to her, quite a few units have overlapping functions.

CAN THOSE IN POWER REFORM JUDICIARY

Mediapool.bg carries an analysis by former prime minister Ivan Kostov, headlined “Can Those in Power Reform the Judiciary?”

Looking into the genesis of an informal network of influence in the judiciary, Kostov writes that ruling politicians shaped the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council and, through its appointments and disciplinary decisions, spread dependencies among the local administrative heads of the prosecution and the courts. These officials, in turn, extend these dependencies to magistrates, since they determine their career development. As a result, magistrates entangled in this network elect dependent members of the Supreme Judicial CounciL, thereby reproducing and expanding its influence. The network can now function and reproduce itself even without political interference, relying solely on clan-based dependencies and influence.

According to the author, this informal network of influence is untouchable. Information has repeatedly circulated in the public sphere that magistrates own expensive properties abroad, that there are discrepancies between their income and assets, and that they have failed to declare their property. The lack of a visible, consistent, and convincing institutional response to such reports has reinforced the general distrust in the judicial system. These examples prove that the network of influence operates without effective criminal or disciplinary accountability. The judicial system refuses to sanction its own violations of the law.

Of amendments, submitted by Progressive Bulgaria to the Judicial System Act, Kostov says that explanatory notes demonstrate a relatively deep understanding of the problems within the judiciary. In fact, they describe the manifestations of the informal network and the dependent majority within the Supreme Judicial Council. However, he has identified a conceptual discrepancy between the motives and the actual text of the bill. Although the motives recognize the concentration of influence, the internal institutional self-reproduction, and the closed system of career dependencies, the proposed amendments do not contain comprehensive mechanisms to overcome these structural deficiencies. They do not propose a systemic reform of the judiciary.

Instead, Kostov offers alternative proposals. First, the functions of the Supreme Judicial Council related to the management of buildings, property and other assets, IT systems, logistics, capital expenditures, and public procurement should be removed through a constitutional amendment, as these functions turn it into an excessively centralized governing body.

Second, the Inspectorate under the Supreme Judicial Council should be re-assigned to the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, its ability to conduct investigations of magistrates because of rulings issued against persons holding high public office should be restricted, unless the magistrates have committed a serious disciplinary or legal violation. Investigations against such magistrates should begin only after meeting a higher threshold for initiation, mandatory public disclosure of the motives, and judicial oversight.

Third, the number of judges and prosecutors should be limited through a cap calculated according to their ratio per 100,000 inhabitants. This ratio should not exceed the average ratio in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Ireland. Expenditures in the judiciary’s budget as a percentage of GDP should also be limited to the corresponding average percentage of expenditures in those same countries.

Fourth, magistrates should be required, under penalty of disciplinary dismissal, to declare family ties, marital relationships, de facto cohabitation, and professional affiliations. Related persons should not be allowed to work in direct hierarchical dependence or serve on the same judicial panel.

Fifth, for 20 years, the author has maintained that the prosecution service should be removed from the judiciary and become part of the Ministry of Justice. Until that happens, the members of the prosecutorial chamber of the SJC elected by the National Assembly should not be acting prosecutors.

WAGE GROWTH MAY UNDERMINE LIVING STANDARDS

In 24 Chasa, Adrian Nikolov of the Institute for Market Economics makes the case that a surge in wages in Bulgaria may be eroding living standards.      

Since the beginning of the decade, Bulgaria has been the absolute leader in the EU in terms of wage growth. In the period between 2020 and 2025, nominal labour costs in the country have increased by 71%, far ahead of the second-placed country, Romania (64%), and third-placed Lithuania (62%). At the other end of the ranking are seven countries with growth below 20%, which against the backdrop of significant inflation during the period likely implies a real decline in wages.

The faster-than-average growth in labour costs, combined with high employment and low unemployment, is the main factor behind the rapid increase, by over 80% over a decade, in real income and living standards in the country.

However, this growth is not necessarily only good news. Since 2022, the dynamics of labour costs have been consistently outpacing improvements in labour productivity.

Two indices, one for labour costs and one for the added value per employee, starting from 2010. throughout the period up to 2022, move in parallel. Initially, productivity slightly outpaces labour costs, and after 2015 the reverse is observed, but the gap remains not particularly significant.

After 2022, however, nominal labour costs significantly outpace nominal productivity. By 2025, labour costs have increased by 163% compared to 2010, while productivity has increased by 124%, meaning the gap is nearly 40 percentage points. This raises questions about how sustainable the current wage growth is in the medium term, as it is gradually outpacing the economic fundamentals that support it.

The current divergence between wages and labour productivity appears temporary, but there is a substantial risk of a slowdown in the rate of improvement in workers’ living standards until productivity catches up.

Such a scenario is not inevitable, provided that timely measures are taken to increase labour productivity. This broadly requires two things. A significant increase in investment activity and mechanization, especially in manufacturing. Entry into the eurozone and the longer political horizon of the new government, and therefore greater confidence in the economic and regulatory environment, create conditions for investment growth, but are not sufficient on their own. The introduction of additional incentives to attract investment, improvements in the functioning of the judicial system, and decentralization all work in this direction and should be among the first priorities of policymakers.

Improvements both in the quality of school education and in the skills of adults. Education reform has been stagnating for a decade, which is also reflected in the results of international assessments, and the most important direction is a shift in the funding model toward incorporating quality evaluation. For adults, there is a need for additional incentives to participate in training and to acquire new skills that are relevant to market demand.

GREAT EMIGRATION OF BULGARIANS ENDS

An analysis by Sega.bg says that the great emigration of Bulgarians has come to an end.

Europe is the continent with the most rapidly aging population, and Bulgaria stands out with negative demographic indicators in almost every respect: the birth rate is low, mortality is high, and in terms of the share of the population aged 65 and over, it is in the Top 3 in the EU. In recent years, however, there has been a new trend in Bulgaria’s demographic picture - the large-scale emigration that we associated with nearly every generation of the transition period is now behind us. Not only are fewer Bulgarians leaving their homeland, but more Bulgarians are returning from abroad. Together with the foreigners arriving in the country, they are the only good news amid a demographic catastrophe.

As of December 31, 2025, Bulgaria’s population was 6,423,207 people. Compared to 2024, the country’s population decreased by 14,153 people, or 0.22%. Detailed data accompanying these statistics are now also available, showing interesting shifts over the last 15 years (all data refer to the 2010–2025 period, except migration data, which cover 2012–2025).

The most remarkable difference in Bulgaria’s demographics before and after the pandemic is related to migration. Far fewer Bulgarians are emigrating. While the number of people leaving the country increased between 2012 and 2019, it declined significantly after the pandemic. In 2012, 13,640 people with Bulgarian citizenship changed moved abroad. This process accelerated in the following years and reached its peak in 2019, when 37,931 Bulgarians left the country.

The pandemic put an end to this migration trend, and 2025 is particularly notable because the number of emigrants holding Bulgarian passports is the lowest in recent years. Moreover, compared to 2024, their number has been cut in half - 9,119 people in 2024 versus 4,532 in 2025. Thus, emigration has decreased eightfold compared to its peak in 2019.

The reverse flow, immigration, is also changing in Bulgaria’s favor. In 2012, 4,964 Bulgarians returned from abroad. By 2024, their number had more than tripled to 18,205, and in 2025 it stood at 17,369 people. There is a tendency to think that the great return began with the pandemic, but in fact it started in 2017, when the number of immigrants increased sharply by more than 40%, marking the beginning of an upward trend.

The reasons for these trends can be found both abroad and in Bulgaria. In some sectors in Bulgaria, incomes have become comparable to European levels, while the cost of living can still be much lower, especially for people who own their homes. In the EU and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the conditions that once attracted Bulgarians have worsened, as the UK left the EU, jobs are harder to find, and so on.

The second relatively new trend is the growing number of foreigners coming to Bulgaria. In 2025, this process slowed compared to 2024, but it still remains at a remarkably different level compared to 2012. Back then, 9,139 foreigners settled in Bulgaria. In 2019, their number was 14,374, and in 2023 it reached a record 39,790 people with the wave of Ukrainians who arrived after the start of the war. In the last two years, the number of incoming foreigners has declined, but it still remains three times higher than in 2012.

This trend has been driven by the crises of recent years, most notably the war in Ukraine, but there are also relatively new factors, such as the import of labour from third countries. A large portion of foreign workers enter for seasonal employment of up to three months, but there are also longer-term residence arrangements aimed at access to the labour market. Data on external migration by region also suggest that there are still active migration processes between Bulgaria and Turkey.

The statistics also reveal another trend: today, the incoming flow of foreigners consists predominantly of people from third countries rather than EU citizens, whereas years ago the two groups were nearly equal in size.

Given Bulgaria’s internal demographic deficits, these external processes deserve much more attention than the superficial changes and modest programmes that currently exhaust state policy on the issue.

FESTIVAL FUNDING AS FIRST TEST AHEAD OF EUROVISION

Ahead of hosting the Eurovision song contest in 2027, Dnevnik.bg looks into festival funding in Bulgaria as the first test of the country’s capacity, asking the question: can the state ensure predictable funding for cultural events that it has itself recognized as nationally significant?

At the beginning of May, several festivals: in Vratsa, Varna, and Shumen, as well as the Sofia jazz festival “A to Jazz” warned that they might not take place because the promised funds had not been disbursed.

The caretaker government approved additional funding of 3,096,779 euros, but not for all of the approved events. Thus the larger question remains – is a model sustainable, where cultural events are planned months in advance, while their funding arrives at the last moment?

Against a calendar of over 220 events and nearly 23 million BGN in required funding, the state provided interim financing for only 56 of the projects.

This is precisely where the main contradiction of the model becomes visible. The National Cultural Calendar creates recognition and expectation, but this is not equivalent to guaranteed and timely payment. If there is no adopted budget, the state can only finance part of the events through ad hoc decisions, while the rest must wait.

For festivals, this is critical because their expenses do not arise on the day of the event. Stages, technical equipment, programming, performers, communications, and logistics are all contracted months in advance. If the agreement with the state is signed only a week or two before the start, the financial risk effectively remains with the organizer.

Economist Petar Ganev from the Institute for Market Economics places the issue in a broader framework. According to him, sustainable funding for cultural events should not be thought of as an annual allocation of resources, but should instead be based on a medium-term commitment and a clearer overview of the entire budget of each event.

“Funding for cultural events should follow a market logic and establish a medium-term commitment - not just year by year, but at least over a three-year horizon,” Ganev says.

However, Ganev also raises another important criterion: when the state finances a cultural event, it must be clear what the organizer’s own contribution is, who its sponsors are, and what portion of the budget depends on public funding.

“For national and large-scale events, the real test of sustainability is whether they can survive without state funding,” says Ganev. If an event is completely dependent on state transfers, and their absence or delay puts it at risk of cancellation, this indicates a weakness not only in state planning but also in the event’s own financial model.